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Abstract—Reputation systems in mobile ad-hoc networks
can be tricked by the spreading of false reputation ratings,
be it false accusations or false praise. Simple solutions such
as exclusively relying on one’s own direct observations have
drawbacks, as they do not make use of all the information
available. We propose a fully distributed reputation sys-
tem that can cope with false disseminated information. In
our approach, everyone maintains a reputation rating and a
trust rating about everyone else that they care about. From
time to time first-hand reputation information is exchanged
with others; using a modified Bayesian approach we de-
signed and present in this paper, only second-hand repu-
tation information that is not incompatible with the current
reputation rating is accepted. Thus, reputation ratings are
slightly modified by accepted information. Trust ratings are
updated based on the compatibility of second-hand reputa-
tion information with prior reputation ratings. Data is en-
tirely distributed: someone’s reputation and trust is the col-
lection of ratings maintained by others. We enable node re-
demption and prevent the sudden exploitation of good repu-
tation built over time by introducing re-evaluation and rep-
utation fading. We present the application of our generic
reputation system to the context of neighborhood watch in
mobile ad-hoc networks, specifically to the CONFIDANT
[3] protocol for the detection and isolation of nodes exhibit-
ing routing or forwarding misbehavior. We evaluate the
performance by simulation.
Index Terms—System design, Simulations, Statistics
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Reputation systems have been proposed for a variety
of applications, among them are the selection of good
peers in a peer-to-peer network, the choice of transac-
tion partners for online auctioning, and the detection of
misbehaved nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks. There is
a trade-off between efficiency in using the available in-
formation and robustness against false ratings [4]. If the
ratings made by others are considered, the reputation sys-
tem can be vulnerable to false accusations or false praise.
However, if only one’s own experience is considered, the
potential of learning from experience made by others goes
unused. Using only positive or only negative information
reduces the vulnerability to only false praise or only false
accusations.
Our goal is to make neighborhood watch systems both
robust against false ratings and efficient at detecting mis-
behavior. We propose a mechanism that makes use of all
the available information, i.e. both positive and negative,
both from own and from others’ experience. To make the
reputation system robust we include a way of dealing with
false ratings.
In the remainder of this paper we refer to the entities in
the reputation system as nodes, since we apply it to nodes
in a mobile ad-hoc network.
B. Solution Overview
The main properties of a reputation system are the rep-
resentation of reputation, how the reputation is built and
updated, and for the latter, how the ratings of others are
considered and integrated. The reputation of a given node
is the collection of ratings maintained by others about this
node. In our approach, a node   maintains two ratings
about every other node  that is cares about. The reputa-
tion rating represents the opinion formed by node   about
node ’s behavior as an actor in the base system (for ex-
ample, whether node  correctly participates in the rout-
ing protocol). The trust rating represents node   ’s opinion
about how honest node  is as an actor in the reputation
system (i.e. whether the reported first hand information
summaries published by node  are likely to be true). We
represent the ratings that node   has about node  as data
structures 
 
for reputation and 
 
for trust. In addi-
tion, node   maintains a summary record of first hand in-
formation about node  in a data structure called 
 
.
To take advantage of disseminated reputation informa-
tion, i.e., to learn from observations made by others before
2having to learn by own experience, we need a means of in-
corporating the reputation ratings into the views of others.
We do this as follows. First, whenever node   makes a first
hand observation of node ’s behavior, the first hand in-
formation 
 
and the reputation rating 
 
are updated.
Second, from time to time, nodes publish their first-hand
information to their neighbors. Say that node   receives
from  some first hand information 

about node . If
 is classified as “trustworthy” by  , or if 

is close to

 
(in a sense that is made precise in Section IV-C) then


is accepted by   and is used to slightly modify the
rating 
 
. Else, the reputation rating is not updated. In
all cases, the trust rating 
 
is updated; if 

is close to

 
, the trust rating 
 
slightly improves, else it slightly
worsens. The updates are based on a modified Bayesian
approach we designed and present in this paper, and on a
linear model merging heuristic.
Note that, with our method, only first hand information

 
is published; the reputation and trust ratings 
 
and

 
are never disseminated.
The ratings are used to make decisions about other
nodes, which is the ultimate goal of the entire reputation
system. For example, in a mobile ad-hoc network, de-
cisions are about whether to forward for another node,
which path to choose, whether to avoid another node
and delete it from the path cache, and whether to warn
others about another node. In our framework, this is
done as follows. Every node uses its rating to peri-
odically classify other nodes, according to two criteria:
(1) regular/misbehaved (2) trustworthy/not trustworthy.
Both classifications are performed using the Bayesian ap-
proach, based on reputation ratings for the former, trust
ratings for the latter.
C. Issues in Reputation Systems for Mobile Ad-hoc Net-
works
Intentional vs. accidental misbehavior. Categoriza-
tions of misbehavior have been proposed, such as self-
ishness vs. malice. Although these types of misbehav-
ior stem from a different motivation, they can be general-
ized as intentional misbehavior. However, we also deem
the consideration of accidental misbehavior of high im-
portance, and we think it is vital to protect the network
against misbehaved nodes regardless the nature of their in-
tentions. Accidental misbehavior can result in a node be-
ing unable to perform correctly due to a lack of resources
or due to its particular location in the network. The en-
hanced version of CONFIDANT, as proposed in this pa-
per, is indifferent to the actual cause of the misbehavior,
be it intentional or accidental. When a node is classified as
misbehaved it simply means that the node performs badly
at routing or forwarding. No moral judgment is implied.
Should liars be punished? If we punish nodes for their
seemingly inaccurate testimonials, we might end up pun-
ishing the messenger and thus discourage honest reporting
of observed misbehavior. Note that we evaluate testimo-
nial accuracy according to affinity to the belief of the re-
questing node along with the overall belief of the network
as gathered over time. The accuracy is not measured as
compared to the actual true behavior of a node, since the
latter is unknown and can not be proved beyond doubt.
Even if it were possible to test a node and obtain a truthful
verdict on its nature, a contradicting previous testimonial
could still be accurate. Thus, instead of punishing deviat-
ing views we restrict our system to merely reduce their im-
pact on public opinion. Some node is bound to be the first
witness of a node misbehaving, thus starting to deviate
from public opinion. Punishing this discovery would be
counterproductive, as the goal is precisely to learn about
misbehaved nodes even before having had to make a bad
experience in direct encounter. Therefore, in our design,
we do not punish a node when it is classified as not trust-
worthy.
Identity. The question of identity is central to repu-
tation systems. We require three properties of identity
which we call persistent, unique, and distinct. The re-
quirement to be persistent means that a node cannot easily
change its identity. One way of achieving this is by expen-
sive pseudonyms. This property is desirable for reputation
systems to enable them to gather the behavior history of
a node. An identity is unique if no other node can use it
and thus impersonate another node. One way to ensure
this is the use of cryptographically generated unique iden-
tifiers, as proposed by Montenegro and Castelluccia [15].
This property is needed to ensure that behavior observed
was indeed that of the node observed. The requirement of
distinct identities is the target of the so-called Sybil attack
analyzed by Douceur [9], where nodes generate several
identities for themselves to be used at the same time. This
property does not so much concern the reputation sys-
tem itself, since those identities that exhibit misbehavior
will be excluded, while other identities stemming from the
same node will remain in the network as long as they be-
have well. The Sybil attack can, however, influence public
opinion by having its rating considered more than once.
In the scenario where the mobile ad-hoc network is not
completely cut off the Internet, we can make use of cer-
tification authorities. An example for such a scenario are
publicly accessible wireless LANs with Internet connec-
tion. The detection and isolation of misbehaved nodes as
achieved by a distributed reputation system for mobile ad-
3hoc networks are still necessary, even in the presence of
network operators. For the case of a pure ad-hoc network
without Internet connectivity, solutions based on public
keys are under investigation, see for example [5].
Redemption. Our solution enforces redemption of
nodes over time, by the combination of two mechanisms:
periodic re-evaluation and reputation fading. Periodic re-
evaluation is implemented by the fact that node classifi-
cation is performed periodically. It is thus possible for
a node to redeem itself, given that nodes have each their
own reputation belief which is not necessarily shared by
all the others. Since their opinions can differ, a node is
most probably not excluded by all other nodes and can
thus partially participate in the network with the poten-
tial of showing its good behavior. Even if this is not the
case and the suspect is excluded by everyone it can re-
deem itself by means of the second mechanism. Repu-
tation fading is implemented by our modification to the
Bayesian update of the posterior, which decays exponen-
tially. Contrary to standard Bayesian estimation, this gives
more weight to recent observations. We also periodically
discount the rating in the absence of testimonials and ob-
servations.
D. Paper Contributions
In this paper we propose a reputation system that makes
neighborhood watch systems in mobile ad-hoc networks,
such as CONFIDANT, robust against false accusations or
false praise while retaining the benefit of using second-
hand information.
We introduce a mechanism based on Bayesian estima-
tion to keep track of both positive and negative reputation
and trust information, as well as the confidence in the re-
spective ratings themselves. We achieve this by employ-
ing the Beta function for reputation and trust representa-
tion.
We modify a Bayesian model merging method to exclu-
sively consider compatible second-hand information and
even then to only slightly influence a node.
We introduce another two mechanisms, namely re-
evaluation and reputation fading. The former consists of
repeated Bayesian classification, and the latter modifies
the standard Bayesian update by an exponential decay of
the posterior. These two mechanisms allow for node re-
demption and at the same time prevent a node from mis-
behaving without hindrance by capitalizing on a good rep-
utation built in the past.
We evaluate the performance of our proposed reputa-
tion system in its application to CONFIDANT by means
of simulation using GloMoSim. We show by simulation
that our method is effective at maintaining at a low level
both the risk of false positives, i.e. deeming another node
misbehaved although it is not, and the risk of false nega-
tives, i.e. not recognizing a node as misbehaved although
it actually misbehaves.
E. Paper Roadmap
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
the next section we describe what we need to know about
the CONFIDANT protocol. Related work is discussed in
Section III. Our Bayesian solution proposal is detailed
in Section IV and its application to CONFIDANT is de-
scribed in Section V. A performance evaluation follows
in Section VI, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. CONFIDANT IN A NUTSHELL
Since we apply our reputation system approach to the
CONFIDANT [3] protocol, we briefly describe its main
features here. The approach we use in CONFIDANT is
to find the selfish and/or misbehaved nodes and to isolate
them, so that misbehavior will not pay off but result in
isolation and thus cannot continue. CONFIDANT is short
for ‘Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc
NeTworks’ and detects misbehaved nodes by means of ob-
servation or reports about several types of attacks, thus
allowing nodes to route around misbehaved nodes and to
isolate them. Figure 1 shows the CONFIDANT compo-
nents as extension to a routing protocol such as Dynamic
Source Routing (DSR)[11].
Nodes have a monitor for observations, reputation
records for first-hand and trusted second-hand observa-
tions about routing and forwarding behavior of other
nodes, trust records to control trust given to received
warnings, and a path manager to adapt their behavior
according to reputation and to take action against mis-
behaved nodes. The term reputation is used to evaluate
routing and forwarding behavior according to the network
protocol, whereas the term trust is used to evaluate partic-
ipation in the CONFIDANT meta-protocol.
The dynamic behavior of CONFIDANT is as follows.
Nodes monitor their neighbors and change the reputation
accordingly. If they have reason to believe that a node
misbehaves, i.e. when the reputation rating is bad, they
take action in terms of their own routing and forwarding.
They thus route around suspected misbehaved nodes. De-
pending on the rating and the availability of paths to the
destination, the routes containing the misbehaved node
are either reranked or deleted from the path cache. Fu-
ture requests by the badly rated node are ignored. In
addition, once a node has detected a misbehaved node,
it informs other nodes by sending an ALARM message.
4Fig. 1. CONFIDANT Components in a Node.
When a node receives such an ALARM either directly
or by promiscuously listening to the network, it evaluates
how trustworthy the ALARM is based on the source of the
ALARM and the accumulated ALARM messages about
the node in question. It can then decide whether to take
action against the misbehaving node.
Simulations for “no forwarding” have shown that CON-
FIDANT can cope well, even if half of the network popu-
lation misbehaves. Note that simply not forwarding is just
one of the possible types of misbehavior in mobile ad-hoc
networks. Several others, mostly concerned with routing
rather that forwarding have been suggested, such as black
hole routing, gray hole routing, worm hole routing. Other
kinds of misbehavior aim at draining energy, such as the
sleep deprivation attack. CONFIDANT is not restricted to
handling any particular kind of misbehavior but can han-
dle any attack that is observable. Even if the observation
cannot precisely be attributed to an attack but is the result
of another circumstance in the network such as a collision,
CONFIDANT can make use of it. If it is a rare accident,
it will anyhow not influence the reputation rating signifi-
cantly, and if it happens more often, it means the observed
node has difficulties performing its tasks.
CONFIDANT is vulnerable to the attack that a trusted
node makes wrong accusations, or that a sufficient num-
ber of nodes collude to make wrong accusations. Also,
CONFIDANT relies exclusively on negative ratings. This
changes if we add to CONFIDANT the reputation system
described in this paper. Indeed, we then have both positive
and negative observations influence the rating, by manag-
ing trust dynamically or not relying on trust at all, and
by limiting the weight of second-hand information alto-
gether.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Reputation Systems in General
False accusations are not an issue in positive reputa-
tion systems, since no negative information is kept [12],
[8], however, the disseminated information could still be
false praise and result in a good reputation for misbehaved
nodes. Moreover, even if the disseminated information
is correct, one cannot distinguish between a misbehaved
node and a new node that just joined the network. Many
reputation systems build on positive reputation only [20],
some couple privileges to accumulated good reputation,
e.g. for exchange of gaming items or auctioning [19].
Positive reputation systems are thus used for where one
has a choice of transaction partners and wishes to find the
best one. In mobile ad-hoc networks, the requirements
are different, the focus is on the isolation of misbehaved
nodes.
B. Applied to Mobile Ad-hoc or Peer-to-Peer Networks
In the following we describe and discuss several mis-
behavior detection and reputation systems that are fully
distributed and hence potential solutions for mobile ad-
hoc networks or peer-to-peer networks. For each of these
we describe the strategy used to detect misbehaved nodes
and to cope with false accusations and relate it to ours.
The following protocols either rely only on first-
hand information or on positive second-hand information.
Since in this paper we evaluate the use of disseminated
information, we provide a quantitative reason, namely the
speed-up of detection time, why they could potentially
benefit from our Bayesian approach while still being ro-
bust against false accusations.
Watchdog and path rater components to mitigate
routing misbehavior have been proposed by Marti, Giuli,
Lai and Baker [13]. They observed increased throughput
in mobile ad-hoc networks by complementing DSR with
a watchdog for detection of denied packet forwarding and
a path rater for trust management and routing policy rat-
ing every path used, which enable nodes to avoid mali-
cious nodes in their routes as a reaction. The nodes rely
on their own watchdog exclusively and do not exchange
reputation information with others. They thus chose the
approach of not using information dissemination, trading
off the robustness against longer detection delay.
CORE, a collaborative reputation mechanism proposed
by Michiardi and Molva [14], also has a watchdog compo-
nent; however it is complemented by a reputation mecha-
nism that differentiates between subjective reputation (ob-
servations), indirect reputation (positive reports by oth-
ers), and functional reputation (task-specific behavior),
which are weighted for a combined reputation value that
is used to make decisions about cooperation or gradual
isolation of a node. Reputation values are obtained by re-
garding nodes as requesters and providers, and comparing
5the expected result to the actually obtained result of a re-
quest. Nodes only exchange positive reputation informa-
tion, thus making the same trade-off between robustness
against lies and detection speed as the watchdog and path
rater scheme, but in addition, false praise can make mali-
cious nodes harder to detect. A performance analysis by
simulation is stated for future work.
The protocols discussed next already use negative
second-hand information and cope with false accusations
by requiring the disseminated information to come from
several sources. Our approach could be beneficial for
them in the case of collusion of several liars. As opposed
to the protocols previously discussed in this section, the
benefit is not straightforward to quantify and thus outside
of the scope of this paper.
A reputation-based trust management has been in-
troduced by Aberer and Despotovic in the context of peer-
to-peer systems [1], using the data provided by a decen-
tralized storage method (P-Grid) as a basis for a data-
mining analysis to assess the probability that an agent will
cheat in the future given the information of past transac-
tions. The disseminated information is exclusively nega-
tive, in the form of complaints that are then redundantly
stored at different agents. When agents want to assess the
trustworthiness of other agents, they query several agents
for complaints about the agent in question. To assess the
trustworthiness of the agents responding to the query and
thus to avoid relying on lies, a complaint query about that
agent can be made. To avoid the exploration of the whole
network, the trustworthiness of the responders is said to
be given when a sufficient number of replicas returns the
same result. An assumption is that the underlying com-
munication network is sound in that the complaints do
not have to be routed through malicious nodes, so the
approach is not readily applicable to mobile ad-hoc net-
works.
A context-aware inference mechanism has been pro-
posed by Paul and Westhoff [17], where accusations are
related to the context of a unique route discovery pro-
cess and a stipulated time period. The rating of nodes
is based on accusations of others, whereby a number of
accusations pointing to a single attack, the approximate
knowledge of the topology, and context-aware inference
are claimed to enable a node to rate an accused node with-
out doubt. An accusation has to come from several nodes,
otherwise the only node making the accusation is itself ac-
cused of misbehavior. While this mechanism discourages
false accusations, it potentially also discourages correct
accusations for fear of being the only denouncer, result-
ing in reduced information dissemination.
The protocols discussed next use second-hand informa-
tion.
A formal model for trust in dynamic networks based
on intervals and a policy language has been proposed by
Carbone, Nielsen, and Sassone [6]. They express both
trust and the uncertainty of it as trust ordering and infor-
mation ordering, respectively. They consider the delega-
tion of trust to other principals. In their model, only posi-
tive information influences trust, such that the information
ordering and the trust ordering can differ. In our system,
both positive and negative information influence the trust
and the certainty, since we prefer  positive observations
that come out of  total observations to  out of  when
 	  . Evaluation of the trust model and the design of
an operational model are stated for future work.
Collaboration enforcement for peer-to-peer net-
works have been proposed by Moreton and Twigg [16].
They allow for selective trust transitivity and distinguish
between trust as participator and trust as recommender.
They define three operators, namely discounting, consen-
sus, and difference, to compute trust values. Since they
use recommenders, trust in participators, trust in recom-
menders, and meta-recommenders, the trust becomes re-
cursive and they thus look for fixed-point solutions to the
resulting trust equations. The performance has not been
evaluated.
As opposed to the Byzantine Generals problem, the
nodes in a misbehavior detection and reputation system
for mobile ad-hoc networks do not have to reach a con-
sensus on which nodes misbehave. Each node can keep
its own rating of the network denoted by the reputation
system entries and it can choose to consider the ratings
of other nodes or to rely solely on its own observations.
One node can have varying reputation records with other
nodes across the network, and the subjective view of each
node determines its actions. Byzantine robustness [18]
in the sense of being able to tolerate a number of errat-
ically behaving servers or in this case nodes is the goal
of a reputation system in mobile ad-hoc networks. Here,
the detection of malicious nodes by means of the reputa-
tion systems has to be followed by a response in order to
render these nodes harmless.
IV. SOLUTION PROPOSAL: A BAYESIAN APPROACH
TO REPUTATION SYSTEMS
A. A Bayesian Framework
Node   models the behavior of node  as an actor in
the base system as follows. Node   thinks that there is a
parameter 
 such that node  misbehaves with probabil-
ity 
, and that the outcome is drawn independently from
observation to observation (Node   thinks that there is a
6different parameter 
 for every different node , and ev-
ery node   may believe in different parameters 
; thus 

should be indexed by   and , but for brevity, we omit the
indices here). The parameters 
 are unknown, and node  
models this uncertainty by assuming that 
 itself is drawn
according to a distribution (the “prior”) that is updated as
new observations become available. This is the standard
Bayesian framework. We use for the prior the distribution
Beta  , as is commonly done [2], [7].
The standard Bayesian procedure is as follows. Ini-
tially, the prior is Beta  , the uniform distribution on
 ; this represents absence of information about which

 will be drawn. Then, when a new observation is made,
say with  observed misbehaviors and  observed correct
behaviors, the prior is updated according to     
and      . If 
, the true unknown value, is con-
stant, then after a large number  of observations,    

(in expectation),       
 and Beta   becomes
close to a Dirac at 
, as expected. The advantage of using
the Beta function is that it only needs two parameters that
are continuously updated as observations are made or re-
ported. See Figure 2 (the actual calculation of the density
has been carried out here for illustrative purpose only).
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Fig. 2. Density of the Beta Function.
We use a modification of the standard Bayesian
method, one for reputation, and one for trust, as described
next.
B. Modified Bayesian Approach for First-Hand Informa-
tion
The first-hand information record 
 
mentioned in the
introduction has the form   . It represents the pa-
rameters of the Beta distribution assumed by node   in its
Bayesian view of node ’s behavior as an actor in the base
system. Initially, it is set to   .
The standard Bayesian method gives the same weight
to each observation, regardless of its time of occurrence.
We want to give less weight to evidence received in the
past to allow for reputation fading. We therefore devel-
oped a modified Bayesian update approach by introducing
a moving weighted average as follows. Assume   makes
one individual observation about ; let    if this ob-
servation is qualified as misbehavior (by a system such as
CONFIDANT), and    otherwise. The update is
    (1)
       (2)
The weight  is a discount factor for past experiences,
which serves as the fading mechanism.
We now analyze how to find a good value of . Call

 
  

the sequence of observations. We can easily de-
rive from Equation (1) that the value of  after  first hand
observations is


 

 
  
  
  

 
 
 (3)
Assume (temporarily) that 
 would be constant. For large
 we would have
  

 


 
(4)
   

 
 

 
(5)
Assume in addition that    
  
is an integer. Thus the
standard Bayesian approach after  observations would
result in the same posterior as ours after infinitely many
observations. Thus, as a rule of thumb, we should select
 as
  


(6)
where  is the order of magnitude of the number of ob-
servations over which we believe it makes sense to assume
stationary behavior.
In addition, during inactivity periods, we periodically
decay the values of   as follows. Whenever the inac-
tivity time expires, we let    and   . This is to
allow for redemption even in the absence of observations.
7C. Reputation Rating and Model Merging
The reputation rating 
 
is also defined by two num-
bers, say   . Initially, it is set to   . It is updated
on two types of events: (1) when first-hand observation is
updated (2) when a reputation rating published by some
other node is copied.
In the former case, the update is the same as for the
first-hand information. More precisely: let     be
the observation:


 

  (7)


 

    (8)
If the update to the first-hand information is due to inac-
tivity, the formula is   ,   .
In the latter case, we use linear pool model merging [2],
as follows. Assume node   receives the reported first-hand
information 

from node . The question is how to
detect and avoid false reports. Our approach is for a node  
to take into account trust and compatibility. If 
 
is such
that   considers  trustworthy according to Equation (14)
(defined later), 

is considered by node   who modifies

 
according to

 
 
 
 

(9)
Here,  is a small positive constant [2]. This is performed
for all  contained in the report.
Otherwise,   considers  not trustworthy, and, for every
node  in the report, uses the results of the deviation test,
as follows. We denote with    Beta   the expectation
of the distribution Beta  . Let 

  

 

 and

 
    The deviation test is
  Beta 

 

   Beta     (10)
where  is a positive constant (deviation threshold). If the
deviation test is positive, the first hand information 

is considered incompatible and is not used. Else 

is
incorporated using Equation (9) as previously.
D. Trust Ratings
Trust rating uses a similar Bayesian approach. Node  
thinks that there is a parameter  such that node  gives
false reports with probability , so it uses for  the prior
Beta  Æ. The trust rating 
 
is equal to   Æ.
Initially,   Æ    . Then an update is performed
whenever node   receives a reported by some node  on
first-hand information about node . Let    if the devi-
ation test in Equation (10) succeeds, and    otherwise.
The trust rating 
 
   Æ is updated by
     (11)
Æ  Æ     (12)
Here  is the discount factor for trust, similar to . There
is a similar update in periods of inactivity as for first hand
information.
Note that the deviation test is always performed,
whether  is considered trustworthy by   or not. In the
former case, it is used only to update 
 
; in the latter
case, it is used to update 
 
and decide whether to up-
date 
 
.
E. Classification
The decision-making process works as follows. First,
the posterior according to all the given data is calculated.
This is done by node   by updating 
 
  

 

 and

 
   Æ as explained above. Then node   chooses the
decision with minimal loss.
We use squared-error loss for the deviation from the
true 
 and ; this amounts to considering   Beta  
for 
 and    Beta  Æ for . More precisely:
Node   classifies the behavior of node  as
 
regular if   Beta   	 
misbehaved if   Beta     (13)
and the trustworthiness of node  as
 
trustworthy if    Beta  Æ 	 
not trustworthy if    Beta  Æ   (14)
The thresholds  and  are an expression of tolerance.
If node   tolerates a node  that misbehaves not more than
half of the time, it should set  to 0.5. In analogy, if  
trusts a node if its ratings deviate no more than in 25% of
the cases, it sets its  to 0.75.
V. APPLICATION TO CONFIDANT
We plugged our system into CONFIDANT as the Rep-
utation System and Trust Manager components. We dis-
cuss the protocol behavior in detail in the following de-
scription.
A. Monitoring
Nodes constantly monitor their neighborhood by
promiscuously listening to transmissions in order to de-
tect misbehavior. Specifically to detect non forwarding,
they make use of passive acknowledgement to verify if
the next-hop node forwards a packet. Every observation
made by node   about node  constitutes an  as defined
in Section IV-B. The observation made is taken as indica-
tion either for regular behavior of a node, i.e. for forward-
ing this is the overheard attempt of forwarding a packet,
8or as indication for misbehavior, the timeout of the pas-
sive acknowledgement timer without overheard forward-
ing. Each observation thus made is given to the reputation
system.
The monitor component not only overhears the routing
and forwarding behavior of the neighborhood but also lis-
tens to published reports. These are handed over to the
trust manager for evaluation and subsequent model inte-
gration by the reputation system.
B. Managing Reputation
Maintaining reputation records. Node   keeps repu-
tation records about every other node  that it cares about.
The records 
 
contain the first-hand observations, 
 
records contain the reputation rating about  including ac-
cepted reports.
Updating reputation. Every time a node   receives
evidence about node  from the monitor, it updates 
 
and 
 
according to Equation (1).
Classifying nodes. When receiving new evidence or
when making a decision about any node , node   checks
its rating of , 
 
, to classify a node as misbehaved or
regular as in Equation (13).
Re-evaluating for redemption. Every time new evi-
dence about node  is considered at node  , it re-evaluates
its classification according to Equation (13). In addition,
for the case that a node has been excluded or simply not
active to enable observation, 
 
is slightly faded as in
Equation (1).
C. Managing Trust
In the trust part of the protocol, we determine how
second-hand information is considered. In Section IV we
explained how models are selected and merged and how
trust is updated. Here we describe where the models come
from.
Exchanging information. From time to time, nodes
publish their first-hand observations of other nodes as re-
ports. This is done by each node, say  , by sending its set
of 
 
for all nodes  that it has observed to its next-hop
neighbors by broadcasting with a TTL set to 1.
Integrating second-hand information. Whenever the
monitor overhears a publication of reputation by an-
other node, it is evaluated for trust according to Equa-
tion (14) and compatibility using the deviation test of
Equation (10).Only the second-hand information that
passed this evaluation is integrated according to Equa-
tion (9). The result of the deviation test is also used to
update the trust of   in , as captured in 
 
, according to
Equation (11). .
D. Managing Paths
The reputation ratings provided by the reputation sys-
tem are used for classifying nodes as regular or misbe-
haved using Equation (14). The latter triggers the follow-
ing actions.
Checking the path cache. Paths that have been ob-
tained by previous Route Requests are stored in the path
cache. Once a node has been classified as misbehaved, the
path cache is searched whether it contains paths including
that node.
Deleting paths. Paths that contain a misbehaved node
are considered contaminated and are deleted.
Rerouting. If after the deletion of contaminated paths
there is no path left to a destination for which a node has
packets to send, it triggers a Route Request according to
DSR.
Re-ranking paths. If the result of a Route Request is
only a set of contaminated paths, the node performs a path
re-ranking and prefers the least contaminated path. This
is an optimistic attempt to get its packets through, since
there is a non-zero probability of the path being salvaged.
And the alternative of not sending at all provides certain
zero throughput.
Ignoring requests. A Route Request received by the
monitor does not trigger a Route Reply by the path man-
ager if the source of the Route Request is classified as
misbehaved. As opposed to the previous actions which
aim at maximizing its own throughput, this action aims at
retribution and isolation of the misbehaved node.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of our reputation system,
as applied to the CONFIDANT protocol by simulation us-
ing the GloMoSim simulator.
A. Goals and Metrics of the Simulation
In previous work, we have shown the performance of
CONFIDANT in increased throughput, decreased number
of packets dropped intentionally, and its overhead in terms
of control messages. In this paper we focus on the ro-
bustness performance of our proposed modified Bayesian
approach as applied to CONFIDANT. Specifically we are
interested in its performance according to the following
metrics.
1) Detection time of misbehaved nodes. We measure
this as the time taken for all misbehaved nodes to be
classified as detected by all regular nodes.
2) Robustness against false accusations (false posi-
tives). We consider a false positive to be the clas-
sification of a regular node as misbehaved by one
regular node.
93) Robustness against false praise (false negatives).
Here we have to distinguish between two cases. The
first case is a misbehaved node that has not been
classified as such by a regular node due to lack of
encounter or second-hand information. The second
case is that a misbehaved node has been classified
as regular despite the information available, hence a
misclassification in the steady state of the protocol.
We call the latter case a false negative.
4) Overhead in terms of control messages, computa-
tion, and storage.
B. Simulation Parameters and Factors
Parameter Level
Area 1000 m  1000 m
Speed uniformly distributed
between 10 and 20 m/s
Radio Range 250 m
Placement uniform
Movement random waypoint model
MAC 802.11
Sending capacity 2 Mbps
Application CBR
Packet size 64 B
Passive ack period 100 ms
Simulation time 900 s
Fading ,  0.999
Threshold  0.75
Threshold  0.5
Publication timer 10 s
Re-evaluation timer 10 s
Fading timer 10 s
TABLE I
FIXED PARAMETERS
The fixed parameters for the simulation are listed in Ta-
ble I. The radio range, sending capacity and MAC have
been chosen to represent an off-the-shelf device, the cho-
sen area approximately represents the center of a town.
The simulation time is chosen to be long enough to po-
tentially roam the whole area. The mobility model cho-
sen is the Random Waypoint Model, but with a range of
10 to 20 m/s to avoid the low-mobility non-stationary ef-
fects of the model [21]. The placement has been chosen
to start with a good network connectivity over the whole
area. Finally, CBR has been chosen for traffic (we refer to
it as applications) to avoid protocol particularities of more
complicated protocols such as TCP.
In order to find out which factors actually have an effect
on the performance metrics and to reduce the number of
experiments, a 	 factorial design according to Jain [10]
is being performed, with  (the number of factors) being
set to 6 ,  (the number of repetitions of the experiment)
set to 10, resulting in experiments or 640 simulation runs,
respectively. Table II shows the factors and the two ex-
treme levels that were chosen for the experiments.
Factor Level 1 Level 2
Number of nodes 10 50
Pause time 0 s 600 s
Percentage of 10% 50%
misbehaved nodes
Weight  0 0.1
Percentage of 10% 50%
untrustworthy nodes
Threshold  0.25 1
TABLE II
LEVELS FOR FACTORIAL DESIGN
The choice for the number of nodes was made with the
intention to show both a very small network that still al-
lows for multiple paths and reasonable network connec-
tivity given the area and a larger network to get insights
on scalability. The pause times were chosen to reflect a
very mobile network as well as a very moderately mobile
one given that the duration of the simulation is 900 s.
To simulate the effect of the trust component and its
absence, we set the threshold  to 0.25 and to 1, the latter
meaning a node trusts anyone.
Similarly, to show the effect of presence or absence of
the reputation system, we set , the weight for second-
hand observations, to 0.1 and 0, the latter meaning that
nodes do not consider second-hand information at all.
C. Results
Figure 3 shows the mean detection time, i.e., the time
in the simulation when the last node detected a particu-
lar misbehaved node, vs. which fraction of the malicious
nodes were detected by all at that time, Figure 4 shows
the maximum detection time for all nodes. We compare
the use of second-hand reports to relying exclusively on
first-hand observation by means of taking extreme val-
ues for , the weight given to second-hand reports at the
model-merging stage. Although the percentage of untrust-
worthy nodes that reversed their reputation ratings when
publishing is as high as 50% in this particular set of exper-
iment runs, it nevertheless pays off to consider compati-
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Fig. 4. Max Detection Time of All Misbehaved Nodes.
ble second-hand reports. The time for detection of misbe-
haved nodes is significantly shorter.
The potential drawback of using a    in terms of
false positives or false negatives is shown in Figures 5 and
6, respectively. Here, the results depend strongly on how
trust is handled. We varied the trust threshold  to show
the effect of the presence or absence of trust management.
Both the false positives and negatives are limited by the
having the effect of the deviation test come into play as
the trust threshold is set to a small value that expresses
trust only when the source of the report has been evaluated
as trustworthy in the past. The smaller the trust thresh-
old, the smaller the probability of a record to be accepted
for model merging, yet even then it improves the decision
making of a node.
The numbers of false positives and negatives do not
vary much with the increase of the proportion of untrust-
worthy nodes, here from 0.1 to 0.5 and 0.9, if the trust
threshold  is significantly smaller than 1.
The ratio of false positives and negatives to correct pos-
itives and negatives, respectively, depend on the simula-
tion time and the frequency of re-evaluation in our sim-
ulation, because the misbehavior is constant over time.
We are currently investigating several adversary types that
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Fig. 6. False Negatives with Increased Untrustworthy Population.
have irregular misbehavior.
Over the course of the simulation, it has emerged that
using second-hand ratings significantly improves on the
performance of the mean detection time when compared
to the using only first-hand observations, yet the perfor-
mance gain is even higher in the worst case, namely the
maximum detection time, i.e., the maximum time it takes
for a misbehaved node to be classified as such by all the
nodes of the network.
The overhead in terms of additional messages is one
local message per node to its one-hop neighbors per pub-
lication interval, in our simulation, once per 10 seconds.
These publications do not get forwarded. Storage over-
head are the three ratings, 
 
, 
 
, and 
 
, that each
node   stores about each node  that it cares about. The
ratings consist of two parameters each.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a robust reputation system
for misbehavior detection in mobile ad-hoc networks. Our
solution is based on a modified Bayesian estimation ap-
proach which we designed. In our approach, everyone
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maintains a reputation rating and a trust rating about ev-
eryone else who is of interest. The approach is fully
distributed and no agreement is necessary. However, to
speed up the detection of misbehaved nodes, it is advanta-
geous to, cautiously, make use also of reputation records
from others in addition to first-hand observations. These
records are only considered in the case when they come
from a source that has consistently been trustworthy or
when they pass the deviation test which evaluates compat-
ibility with one’s own reputation ratings. Even after pass-
ing the test, they only slightly modify the reputation rating
of a node. The results of the deviation test are additionally
used to update the trust rating. We allow for redemption
and prevent capitalizing excessively on past behavior by
two mechanisms, namely re-evaluation and fading. We
presented a concrete application of our proposed reputa-
tion system to a neighborhood watch system for mobile
ad-hoc networks, specifically the CONFIDANT protocol.
We evaluated the performance by simulation and showed
that our method is coping well with false second-hand re-
ports, as it keeps the number of false positives and false
negatives low. The simulation also showed that the de-
tection of misbehaved nodes accelerates significantly with
the use of selected second-hand information. Further per-
formance evaluation by simulation and the investigation
of additional elaborate adversary models, both for misbe-
havior and for trustworthiness, are under way.
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